Review of Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics Z and H, by Michael J. Loux (Cornell University Press: 1991).

Although Michael Yong-Set's proposal to approach argumentation theory from a ludological perspective is not yet sufficiently developed to warrant adopting it, there is enough to warrant exploring it further – which is all the reception it needs at this point.

The problem of justifying legal punishment has been at the heart of legal and social philosophy from the very earliest recorded philosophical texts. However, despite several hundred years of debate, philosophers have not reached agreement about how legal punishment can be morally justified. That is the central issue addressed by the contributors to this volume. All of the essays collected here have been published in the highly respected journal Philosophy & Public Affairs. Taken together, they offer not only significant proposals (...) for improving established theories of punishment and compelling arguments against long-held positions, but also ori-ginal and important answers to the question, "How is punishment to be justified?"Part I of this collection, "Justifications of Punishment," examines how any practice of punishment can be morally justified. Contributors include Jeffrie G. Murphy, Alan H. Goldman, Warren Quinn, C. S. Nino, and Jean Hampton. The papers in Part II, "Problems of Punishment," address more specific issues arising in established theories. The authors are Martha C. Nussbaum, Michael Davis, and A. John Simmons. In the final section, "Capital Punishment," contributors discuss the justifiability of capital punishment, one of the most debated philosophical topics of this century. Essayists include David A. Conway, Jeffrey H. Reiman, Stephen Nathanson, and Ernest van den Haag. (shrink)

In "Stanley Cavell and the Limits of Appreciation," Ted Cohen restates his hatred of Richard Wagner's music. Cohen hears something "very nasty" in Wagner's music, "an element of Nazism," to borrow Thomas Mann's phrase for what Mann, too, found disturbing in Wagner.1 Whereas Mann was still able to value Wagner's music, Cohen despises listening to it. Cohen realizes that his revulsion sets him apart not only from Mann but also from W. H. Auden, who praised Wagner's (...) "consummate skill" in creating heroes and heroines who exhibit the irrationality and self-destructiveness of human nature "in all its formidable enchantment."2 Cohen notes how another eminent listener, Arturo Toscanini, also thought Wagner's music worth... (shrink)

Contents: PART I: AESTHETICS OF ARCHITECTURE: QUESTIONS. Francis SPARSHOTT: The Aesthetics of Architecture and the Politics of Space. Arnold BERLEANT: Architecture and the Aesthetics of Continuity. Stephen DAVIES: Is Architecture Art? PART II: NATURE OF ARCHITECTURE. B.R. TILGHMAN: Architecture, Expression, and the Understanding of a Culture. David NOVITZ: Architectural Brilliance and the Constraints of Time. Michael H. MITIAS: Expression in Architecture. Ralf WEBER: The Myth of Meaningful Forms. Michael H. MITIAS: Is Meaning in Architecture a Myth? A Response (...) to Ralf Weber. PART III: AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE IN ARCHITECTURE. Allen CARLSON: Existence, Location, and Function: The Appreciation of Architecture. Martin DONOUGHO: Spaced Out or Folded In? Trends in Architectural Choreography. Tom LEDDY: Dialogical Architecture. Roy T. DECKER: Tactility and Imagination: Considerations of Aesthetic Experience in Architecture. Robert GINSBERG: Aesthetics in Hiroshima. The Architecture of Remembrance. (shrink)

Friendship was recognized as a central moral value in the classical period, but it was dismissed from medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. This book argues that this dismissal is unjustifiable. The validity of this claim is established in four steps. First, it proposes the concept of moral paradigm. This concept enables us to explore the source of moral value and to provide a criterion for the evaluation of the adequacy of moral theory. Second, the book explains why medieval, (...) modern and twentieth century moral theorists neglected friendship as a central moral value in their analysis of moral behavior and why this neglect was unjustifiable. Third, it explains why the classical moral philosophers viewed friendship as a central moral value. Fourth, it argues that friendship is an ontological need, therefore, a necessary condition of the moral life. This need is implicitly recognized in the moral paradigms that underlie the moral theories of the medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. Accordingly it cannot be neglected in the process of moral theorizing. (shrink)

Twenty Years After Communism is concerned with the explosion of a politics of memory triggered by the fall of state socialism in Eastern Europe, and it takes a comparative look at the ways that communism and its demise have been commemorated by major political actors across the region.

Mirrored-self misidentification is the delusional belief that one's own reflection in the mirror is a stranger. In two experiments, we tested the ability of hypnotic suggestion to model this condition. In Experiment 1, we compared two suggestions based on either the delusion's surface features (seeing a stranger in the mirror) or underlying processes (impaired face processing). Fifty-two high hypnotisable participants received one of these suggestions either with hypnosis or without in a wake control. In Experiment 2, we examined the extent (...) to which social cues and role-playing could account for participants' behaviour by comparing the responses of 14 hypnotised participants to the suggestion for impaired face processing (reals) with those of 14 nonhypnotised participants instructed to fake their responses (simulators). Overall, results from both experiments confirm that we can use hypnotic suggestion to produce a compelling analogue of mirrored-self misidentification that cannot simply be attributed to social cues or role-playing. (shrink)

Commentators disagree about the extent to which Kant’s ethics is compatible with consequentialism. A question that has not yet been asked is whether Kant had a view of his own regarding the fundamental difference between his ethical theory and a broadly consequentialist one. In this paper I argue that Kant does have such a view. I illustrate this by discussing his response to a well-known objection to his moral theory, namely that Kant offers an implicitly consequentialist theory of moral appraisal. (...) This objection was most famously raised by Mill and Schopenhauer, but also during Kant’s time by Pistorius and Tittel. I show that Kant’s response to this objection in the second Critique illustrates that he sees the fundamental difference between his moral theory and a broadly consequentialist one to be one that concerns methodology. (shrink)

We define a rich model to be one which contains a proper elementary substructure isomorphic to itself. Existence, nonstructure, and categoricity theorems for rich models are proved. A theory T which has fewer than $\min(2^\lambda,\beth_2)$ rich models of cardinality $\lambda(\lambda > |T|)$ is totally transcendental. We show that a countable theory with a unique rich model in some uncountable cardinal is categorical in ℵ 1 and also has a unique countable rich model. We also consider a stronger notion of richness, (...) and use it to characterize superstable theories. (shrink)

Miguel Díaz has succeeded quite well not only in providing support for popular Hispanic religion through an analysis of ideas from Karl Rahner, but skillfully meets several possible objections or alternatives. Nonetheless, the more sophisticated forms of Hispanic theology must also be sustained, if only to address adequately the transcendental atheism that the current and subsequent generation of Latino/a college students will encounter.

Miguel Díaz has succeeded quite well not only in providing support for popular Hispanic religion through an analysis of ideas from Karl Rahner, but skillfully meets several possible objections or alternatives. Nonetheless, the more sophisticated forms of Hispanic theology must also be sustained, if only to address adequately the transcendental atheism that the current and subsequent generation of Latino/a college students will encounter.

We examine the ethical, social, and regulatory barriers that may hinder research on therapeutic potential of certain controversial controlled substances like marijuana, heroin, or ketamine. Hazards for individuals and society and potential adverse effects on communities may be good reasons for limiting access and justify careful monitoring of these substances. Overly strict regulations, fear of legal consequences, stigma associated with abuse and populations using illicit drugs, and lack of funding may, however, limit research on their considerable therapeutic potential. We review (...) the surprisingly sparse literature and address the particular ethical concerns pertinent to research with illicit and addictive substances, such as undue inducement, informed consent, therapeutic misconception, and risk to participants, researchers, and institutions. We consider the perspectives of key research stakeholders and explore whether they may be infected with bias. We conclude by proposing an empirical research agenda to provide an evidentiary basis for ethical reasoning. (shrink)

Physical environmental factors – or ‘artifacts’ – are linked to healthcare outcomes in the field of social psychology. However, the role of artifacts remains rarely examined in the burgeoning discipline of placebo studies. In this paper, we argue that a careful consideration of artifacts – such as provider clothing and office décor – may carry significant potential in eliciting placebo effects in clinical settings. We discuss three potential mechanisms by which artifacts may enhance or diminish placebo (or nocebo) effects: classical (...) conditioning, response expectancy, and mindsets. We propose testable hypotheses and conclude by providing innovative research designs that might help to better advance this novel research agendum. (shrink)

Recently proposed models of risky choice imply systematic violations of transitivity of preference. This study explored whether people show the predicted intransitivity of the two models proposed to account for the certainty effect in Allais paradoxes. In order to distinguish “true” violations from those produced by “error,” a model was fit in which each choice can have a different error rate and each person can have a different pattern of preferences that need not be transitive. Error rate for a choice (...) is estimated from preference reversals between repeated presentations of the same choice. Results showed that few people repeated intransitive patterns. We can retain the hypothesis that all participants were transitive. (shrink)

Let K be a finite set of finite structures. We give a syntactic characterization of the property: every element of K is injective in ISP(K). We use this result to establish that A is injective in ISP(A) for every two-element algebra A.

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We characterize the model companions of universal Horn classes generated by a two-element algebra (or ordered two-element algebra). We begin by proving that given two mutually model consistent classes M and N of L (respectively L') structures, with $\mathscr{L} \subseteq \mathscr{L}'$ , M ec = N ec ∣ L , provided that an L-definability condition for the function and relation symbols of L' holds. We use this, together with Post's characterization of ISP(A), where A is a two-element algebra, to show (...) that the model companions of these classes essentially lie in the classes of posets and semilattices, or characteristic two groups and relatively complemented distributive lattices. (shrink)

Human beings are essentially vulnerable in the view that their existence qua humans is not given but construed. This vulnerability receives basic protection from the State, expressed in the form of the universal rights all citizens are meant to enjoy. In addition, many individuals fall prey to destitution and deprivation, requiring social action aimed at recognising the specific harms they suffer and providing remedial assistance to palliate or remove their plights.Citizens receive protection against their biologic vulnerability by means of an (...) in rem right to health [care], which is more an attitude of protection than a specific programme. When individuals become susceptible, that is, biologically weak or diseased, they also increase their predisposition to additional harm, and require social actions to treat their demeaned condition. Such assistance takes the form of positive healthcare rights.Research on human beings has been slow to observe that the subjects recruited are susceptible, especially so if research is done in less developed countries. By mislabelling them as vulnerable – a characteristic they share with all humans – sponsors avoid registering the deprivation these people suffer, and the ethical obligation to offer them remedial help.The distinction between vulnerability and susceptibility also marks the difference between being intact but fragile – vulnerable – and being injured and predisposed to compound additional harm – susceptible. Awareness of this difference should give additional force to the rejection of double standards in research ethics. (shrink)

The so-called European principles of bioethicsare a welcome enrichment of principlistbioethics. Nevertheless, vulnerability, dignityand integrity can perhaps be moreaccurately understood as anthropologicaldescriptions of the human condition. Theymay inspire a normative language, but they donot contain it primarily lest a naturalisticfallacy be committed. These anthropologicalfeatures strongly suggest the need todevelop deontic arguments in support of theprotection such essential attributes ofhumanity require. Protection is to beuniversalized, since all human beings sharevulnerability, integrity and dignity, thusfundamenting a mandate requiring justice andrespect for fundamental human (...) rights.Being a feature of all humanity, vulnerabilityis improperly extended to designatedestitute individuals and populations. Rather,they are in a state of fallen vulnerability,for they already are harmed in some way, andhave become deprived of their range ofcapabilities. These individuals are destituteand are no longer in command of theirfundamental human rights. They have lost thestatus of unharmed vulnerability;identifying them as susceptible – vulnerated andno longer only vulnerable – stresses thepoint that bioethics demands specific socialaction to palliate or remove their distress.When harm does occur – in the form of disease,for example –, individuals are no longervulnerable – for they have ceased to be intact–, they become susceptible to additionaldeprivations and sickness; integrity isdemeaned and dignity is offended, leading tostates of dysfunction that require specificremedial social practices, aimed at treatingand removing injuries.The main point this paper addresses is thatvulnerability – as well as dignity and integrity – are descriptive characteristics ofhuman beings qua humans, which are not normative in themselves, but fundamental enoughto inspire bioethical requirements of protection and respect for human rights in thewake of social justice. A clear distinction must be made in regard to human beings who areinjured by poverty, sickness, discriminating deprivations or suffer otherdestitutions, having ceased to be only vulnerable for they are no longer intact. Theseindividuals and populations require more than protection, their needs must be met byspecific care and remedial measures to be identified and instigated by bioethics quaapplied ethics. (shrink)

Parties are back, and many are cheering. Party polarization has voters seeing stark differences between Democrats and Republicans and demonstrating more ideological constraint than previous generations. But these signs of a more “responsible” electorate are an illusion, because the public is no more knowledgeable than ever about the type of “information” it needs if it is to exercise effective control over the public‐policy outcomes it cares the most about. Indeed, polarization has produced a political environment where both voters and policy (...) makers may be less likely to learn about the potential consequences of their governing choices. The result is that holding elected politicians to account for policies treated as divisive ends in themselves has become easier—but that holding them accountable for policies intended as means to the achievement of consensual ends has become harder. (shrink)